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Recognition as an Affirmative Step in the
Decolonization Process: The Case
of Western Sahara
Robert T. Vance, Jr.t
Sooner or later, but sooner rather than later, our continent will be purged
of all forms of colonialism, for the fire of intense nationalism is blazing all
over Africa and burning to ashes the last remnants of colonialism.
Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom
Introduction
The right of colonial peoples to self-determination is a widely ac-
cepted norm of customary international law.' This rig ht has been rec-
ognized and affirmed by the United Nations and other international
bodies, including the International Court of Justice, as the principal
right at stake in decolonization.2 In the case of Western Sahara, a for-
mer colonial possession of Spain, self-determination has been thwarted
since 1975 by Moroccan military occupation.3 As of February 28, 1976,
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School
1. Self-determination has been defined as "the right of a nation to constitute an in-
dependent state and determine its own government for itself," A. COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION 45-46 (1945), or, "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of
peoples," Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 33.
2. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12,32. The principle of self-deter-
mination as a right of all peoples, and its application for the purpose of decolonization, was
first enunciated by'the General Assembly in the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
66, U.N. Doe. A/4684/Add.1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Res. 1514 (XV)]. Since the adop-
tion of that resolution, and of G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc.
A/4684/Add.1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Res. 1541 (XV)], which established additional
standards for decolonization, the General Assembly and its various committees have applied
this principle, with few exceptions, in their efforts to decolonize Africa, Asia, and Central
and South America.
3. See text accompanying notes 66-82 infra. Western Sahara lies along the Atlantic
coast of northwest Africa directly opposite the Canary Islands. It has a total area of about
266,000 square kilometers and a seacoast of 1,062 kilometers. Its frontier with Morocco and
Algeria is 475 kilometers long, and that with Mauritania is 1,570 kilometers. The indige-
nous inhabitants *of Western Sahara are nomadic. According to a 1974 census, 73,497
Saharans and 20,126 Europeans lived in the Territory. 'The coast of Western Sahara is ex-
tremely hazardous for shipping, a fact that has prevented the Territory from participating on
any large scale in the commercial exploitation of the rich fishing resources of its continental
shelf. The Territory has extensive deposits of phosphate in the Bu Craa region, only 97
kilometers from the coast. Large-scale mining and exportation of this resource began in
1974 under the direction of FOSBUCRAA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Instituto Na-
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the Frente Popular para la Liberaci6n de Saguia El Hamra y Rio de
Oro (Frente POLISARIO), the dominant political organization in
Western Sahara,4 had declared the establishment of the Saharuie Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR).5 The SADR government in exile and
the Frente POLISARIO, headquartered in Algiers, are currently en-
gaged in a war with Morocco seeking to acquire effective control over
Western Sahara. Although efforts are currently underway to end the
conflict,6 the lack of a concerted international effort to pressure Mo-
rocco to withdraw its armies from Western Sahara and thereby permit
effective realization of the right to self-determination by the Saharwi
people may be viewed as a reason for the current stalemate in the
region.
This Article examines the events leading to the juridical affirmation
of the right of the Saharwi people to self-determination, subsequent
actions on the part of third States that frustrated the realization of that
right, the founding of the SADR, and relevant international develop-
ments since 1976. The theory and practice of recognition with regard
to States and governments-in-exile are analyzed in order to develop the
theoretical framework on which the thesis of this Article rests, namely,
that recognition of the SADR government-in-exile and recognition of
Frente POLISARIO claims to participation are consistent with the
right of colonial peoples to self-determination and thereby with the
peremptory norm of international law with respect to decolonization.7
cional de Industria, a Spanish concern. In 1975, it was projected that Western Sahara at full
production would produce 10 million metric tons of phosphates per year, making it the
second largest exporter of phosphate after Morocco. In the early 1960's, a search for petro-
leum in the northern part of the Territory yielded no positive results, but it was reported in
1975 that four companies held prospecting concessions in the coastal waters. Report of the
United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, 1975, in the Report of the Special Com-
mittee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 30 U.N. GAOR, 3 Supp. (No. 23)
26-28, 40, U.N. Doc. A/10023/Add.5, Annex (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Visit-
ing Mission to Spanish Sahara].
4. The 1975 United Nations Visiting Mission found overwhelming popular support for
the Frente POLISARIO. Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3, at
7. Currently, two political organizations claim as yet unmeasured support among the
Saharwi people in Western Sahara and the Saharwi refugees in Morocco. Both these orga-
nizations are pro-Morocco and favor integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. See 35
U.N. GAOR, C.4 (15th mtg.) 3-9, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/SR.15 (1980) (statements of repre-
sentatives of Front de liberation du Sahara and of Mouvement des originaires de la Sakiat-
el-Hamra et du Rio de Oro (AOSARIO)). These organizations have been denounced as
puppets of Morocco who do not represent the Saharwi people. 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (21st
mtg.) 15, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/SR.21 (1980) (statement of representative of Algeria).
5. See note 82 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 227-31 infra.
7. The term "colonial" in this Article is meant to be interpreted in a strictly judicial
manner, and not in the larger sociological sense. That is, the term "colonial" is meant to
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The year 1975 was critical to the decolonization of Western Sahara.
In 1975, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly sent a Visiting
Mission to the Territory, 8 and the International Court of Justice ren-
dered an Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 9 the results of which
both politically and legally defeated Moroccan and Mauritanian claims
of historic title to Western Sahara. Prior to 1975, the General Assem-
bly had consistently manifested its support for the right of the Saharwi
people to self-determination by adopting nine resolutions on the ques-
tion of Western Sahara.'0 Yet in December, 1975, confronted with
continued Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of Western Sahara,
the General Assembly reversed its position of steadfast commitment to
self-determination for the Saharwi people."I The implications of this
shift for a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict will be ex-
amined in the appraisal of policy options.' 2
I. The Case of Western Sahara: A Conflict of Principles
The case of Western Sahara has appeared on the agenda of the
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly since 1963.13 From the
beginning of the controversy, the issue at stake involved a determina-
tion as to which of two competing peremptory principles,jus cogens, of
international law should be applied in the decolonization of Western
Sahara: the right of the Saharwi people to self-determination or the
refer only to those territorial entities which, in U.N. practice, have been considered colonies
of a European power, or more recently, overseas dependencies of the United States. There
remain a number of territorial communities that have yet to achieve independence. See
generally Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, 34 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 23) 1, U.N. Doc. A/34/23/Add.1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization].
8. Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3. See text accompany-
ing notes 38-51 infra.
9. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12. See text accompanying notes
52-65 infra.
10. G.A. Res. 2072, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as Res. 2072 (XX)]; G.A. Res. 2229, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 72, U.N.
Doc. 6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Res. 2229 (XXI)]; G.A. Res. 2354, 22 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2428, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
18) 63, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2591, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 73, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2711, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 100, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2983, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 84, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972);
G.A. Res. 3162,28 U.N. GAOR, I Supp. (No. 30) 110, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res.
3292, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 103, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Res. 3292 (XXIX)].
11. This about-face occurred with the adoption of G.A. Res. 3458, 30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 34) 116-17, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 221-41 infra.
13. 18 U.N. GAOR, CA (1506th mtg.) 519, 522-23, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.1506 (1963).
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right of Morocco and Mauritania to have their national unity and terri-
torial integrity respected.14
The-General Assembly first addressed the issue of decolonization of
Western Sahara in Resolution 2072(XX) 15 of December 16, 1965. At
that time, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right of colonial
peoples to self-determination in accordance with the principles embod-
ied in Resolution 1514(XV), 16 and urgently requested Spain, as the Ad-
ministering Power, ". . . to take immediately all necessary measures
for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from
colonial domination, and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the
problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories." 7
Resolution 2072(XX) envisioned the decolonization of Western Sa-
hara through a process of negotiation between Spain and the Special
Committee.' 8 No reference was made in the Resolution to the proce-
14. The two competing norms are embodied in paragraphs 2 and 6 of General Assembly
Resolution 1514:
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 2.
15. Res. 2072(XX), supra note 10.
16. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 2.
17. Res. 2072 (XX), supra note 10, at para. 2. Ifni, the smaller of the two Territories, was
regarded as a "colonial enclave," a small territory surrounded on all sides by an independ-
ent State, in this case Morocco. United Nations practice with respect to colonial enclaves
has been to deny the indigenous population the right to self-determination on the assump-
tion that the territory concerned should be integrated into the surrounding State. As a prin-
ciple of international law, integration is relevant only in the most limited circumstances, that
is, to tiny territories ethnically and economically parasites of, or deriving from that State,
and that cannot be said in any legitimate sense to constitute separate territorial units. The
principle is not applicable to larger, more viable territories such as Western Sahara. J.
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 384 (1979). See also A.
RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 214-20 (1973).
The prerequisites to integration as a mode of self-determination are set out in Principle IX
of Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 2. Thus far, four territories have been integrated with other
States on grounds of national unity rather than self-determination for the territories them-
selves: Goa and dependencies, and French Establishments in India (India); Ifni (Morocco);
and Sao Joao Batista de Adjuda (Dahomey). J. CRAWFORD, supra at 370.
18. The Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, created in 1961, is the only U.N. body
concerned exclusively with matters relating to dependent and non-self-governing territories.
The Committee was created by the General Assembly by G.A. Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 17) 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). Pursuant to its purpose, the Special Commit-
tee may consult with the administering powers of the dependent and non-self-governing
territories, send visiting missions and commissions of inquiry to dependent and non-self-
governing territories, observe and supervise elections and plebiscites, and receive petitions
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dure by which the Saharwi people would exercise their right to self-
determination. This specific question was not addressed until the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 2229(XXI)' 9 on December 20, 1966.
In sum and substance, Resolution 2229(XXI) was the strongest, most
definitive statement by the General Assembly concerning Western Sa-
hara to date. It became the model for all subsequent resolutions until
Resolution 3292(XXIX)20 was adopted in 1974. The Resolution con-
tained four significant policy and procedural declarations concerning
the decolonization of Western Sahara:
1) The right of the Saharwi people to self-determination was af-
firmed as the paramount legal right in the decolonization of Western
Sahara.2'
2) A referendum conducted under the auspices of the United Na-
tions would be utilized to ensure self-determination for the Saharwi
people.22
3) The General Assembly implicitly rejected Moroccan and
Mauritanian claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara, yet recognized
the existence of such claims, valid or otherwise, by granting the two
States locus standi to negotiate with Spain and any other interested
party concerning the procedures for conducting the referendum. 23
4) All exiles would be freely allowed to return to Western Sahara to
participate in the referendum, the privilege of voting in which would be
extended to indigenous Saharans only.24
The final noteworthy feature of Resolution 2229(XXI) lies in the op-
erative paragraph 5 by which the General Assembly requested the Sec-
retary General, in consultation with Spain and the Special Committee,
to appoint a special mission to be sent to Western Sahara. . . "for the
purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of
the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for
determining the extent of United Nations participation in the prepara-
tion and supervision of the referendum ...
The essence of Resolution 2229(XXI) was repeated, with minor
changes, in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly. The
from dependent and non-self-governing territories. Seegenerally A. RIGO-SUREDA, supra
note 17, at 294-323.
19. Res. 2229 (XXI), supra note 10.
20. Res. 3292 (XXIX), supra note 10,
21. Res. 2229 (XXI), supra note 10, at para. 1.
22. Id. para. 4.
23. Id. paras. 3, 4.
24. Id. paras. 4(a), 4(b).
25. Id. para. 5.
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changes made reflected the volatile political climate in Western Sa-
hara.26 As the Saharwi people began to express discontent with their
colonial status, the General Assembly responded, in 1970, with Resolu-
tion 2711 (XXV),2 7 calling upon Spain to take effective measures to cre-
ate the atmosphere of d&ente required for the orderly administration of
a referendum. Therein, the General Assembly acknowledged the legit-
imacy of the struggle of the Saharwi people,28 called upon all States to
provide them with all necessary assistance,29 and invited all States to
refrain from making investments in the Territory in order to hasten
self-determination for the Saharwi people.30
Preferring not to second-guess the Saharwi people, the General As-
sembly was careful not to make an explicit reference to the future status
of Western Sahara in the Resolution. By 1972, the intensity with which
the question of self-determination for the Saharwi people was discussed
in the international community3' and the heightened political aware-
ness of the Saharwi people combined to produce the near certainty that
a referendum would lead to independence for Western Sahara. The
General Assembly acknowledged this sentiment, and in Resolution
2983(XXVII) 32 reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Saharwi people
not only to self-determination, but also to independence. By requesting
States to give "all necessary moral and material" assistance to the
Saharwi people in their legitimate struggle, in conformity with U.N.
practice, this resolution expanded the necessary assistance called for in
Resolution 2711 (XXV).
33
26. G.A. Res. 2354,22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A.
Res. 2428, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 63, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2591, 24
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 73, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
27. G.A. Res. 2711, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 100, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
28. Id. para. 8.
29. Id.
30. Id. para. 7.
31. See Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, 27 U.N. GAOR, 4 Supp. (No. 23) 30, U.N. Doc. A/8723/Rev. I (1973).
32. G.A. Res. 2983, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 84, U.N. Doc. A/8955 (1972).
33. Id. para. 2. Conditions in the Territory remained essentially unchanged until 1973.
Spain in effect ignored the mandate of repeated General Assembly resolutions which called
for a referendum and the establishment of a visiting mission on the grounds that, because of
the nomadic nature of the population and the physical features of Western Sahara, prepara-
tion for an act of self-determination by the Saharwi people could not be hurried. Letter
dated Sept. 8, 1966, from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations
addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Adden-
dum to Agenda Item 23) 621, U.N. Doc. A/6300/Rev.l (1966). This argument conflicts with
the principle of paragraph 3 of Res. 1514(XV), supra note 2, that political, economic, social,
and educational unpreparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
At this time the Djemaa, or General Assembly of the Sahara, was the highest representa-
tive body in the Territory. See Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note
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Confronted with increased pressure from U.N. Member States expe-
ditiously to decolonize Western Sahara, Spain stated in July, 1974 that
it would soon issue a new Political Statute for the Territory.34 To
everyone's surprise, Spain then announced that a referendum would be
held in Western Sahara, under U.N. auspices, during the first six
months of 1975.35 Subsquently, on December 13, 1974, the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 3292(XXIX), that requested the Special
Committee to send a visiting mission to Western Sahara and called on
the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the
following questions:
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nulius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?
36
The General Assembly took the position that the submission of the le-
gal questions to the Court was "without prejudice to the application of
the principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)." 37
A. The U.N. Visiting Mission
During the months of May and June, 1975, the Visiting Mission trav-
eled to Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, and Western Sahara with
the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the indigenous Saharans and
3, at 29-30. In 1973, the Djemaa adopted a statement, reprinted in Letter dated Sept. 28,
1973, from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/9176, Annex 1 (1973), to the effect that the future of the
Saharwi people should be decided through a referendum. Generalissimo Franco responded
by addressing to the Djemaa a decree that granted it increased legislative power, acknowl-
edged the Saharwi peoples' ownership of the Territory's natural resources and the proceeds
of its development, and reiterated Spain's guarantee that the population of Western Sahara
would freely determine its future when it so requested. The decree granted the Djemaa a
substantial increase in control over the internal affairs of the region and all rights inherent in
Spanish nationality, but reserved to Spain control over external affairs, the right to defend
the region, and certain veto powers over actions of the Djemaa. Letter dated Sept. 28, 1973,
from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doe. A/9176, Annex IV (1973).
It was also during 1973 that the popular liberation movements in Western Sahara began
to take an active role in hastening the decolonization process. The Frente POLISARIO was
formed on May 10, 1973, and ten days later launched its first attack against the Spanish at El
Kharga. Seegeneralo Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3, at 62-
64.
34. Letter dated July 10, 1974, from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe. A/9655 (1974).
35. Letter dated Aug. 20, 1974, from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Do. A/9714 (1974).
36. Res. 3292 (XXIX), supra note 10.
37. Id. para. I.
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the views of the concerned and interested States as to how the process
of decolonization should proceed in Western Sahara. 38 The Visiting
Mission went first to Madrid.
As a result of the deterioration of the situation in Western Sahara,
Spain wanted to terminate its presence in the Territory by an orderly
transfer of power. Spain wished to include the concerned parties in the
decolonization process through negotiation, yet did not wish to arbi-
trate the competing claims of Morocco and Mauritania. Spain also in-
dicated that the appropriate discharge of its duties in Western Sahara
entailed adherence to the relevant General Assembly resolutions so
that the transfer of power would be to freely chosen representatives of
the indigenous population.
39
Morocco put forth a claim to Western Sahara on juridical, adminis-
trative, socio-economic, and cultural grounds, and argued that its view
had been a matter of public record since 1956.40 Insofar as actual
decolonization was concerned, Morocco contended that the decoloniza-
tion of Western Sahara implied reintegration into Morocco. This claim
was based on the theory that Morocco, as a national unit, had been the
victim of a unique form of colonial dismemberment: during the colo-
nial period, one part of the national territory became a protectorate of
Spain (Western Sahara) while the other became a protectorate of
France (Morocco proper). In accordance with the principle of opera-
tive paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514(XV) 4 1 and Resolution
2625(XXV),42 Morocco asserted that it was merely defending the integ-
rity of its territory. For Morocco, self-determination or the right of
Western Sahara to free determination never meant abandoning a part
of its territory.4
3
Morocco also denied that the presence of phosphate in the region
precipitated its territorial claims; Rabat noted that its claims to Western
Sahara, officially announced in 1956, antedated the prospecting for,
and discovery of, phosphate in the Territory. Furthermore, Morocco
declared that it already had sufficient reserves of phosphate to continue
exploiting them for eight more centuries.44
38. Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3.
39. For a more complete discussion of Spain's views, see id. at 75-79.
40. For a more complete discussion of the evolution of Morocco's position regarding
Western Sahara, see id. at 21-23.
41. See note 13 supra.
42. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Res. 2625(XXV)].
43. For a more complete discussion of Morocco's views, see Report of the Visiting Mis-




Morocco disapproved of the referendum contemplated by Spain, be-
lieving that it would be detrimental to decolonization because it would
result in the creation of a puppet State.45 Morocco, however, indicated
that it would accept a referendum if Spain agreed to withdraw troops
and administrative personnel from Western Sahara, if the U.N. dis-
patched troops to the Territory, and if the only question posed in the
consultation were "Do you want to remain under the authority of
Spain or to rejoin Morocco?" 46
Mauritania stated that its policy regarding Western Sahara was, and,
since 1957, had been based on two principles. First, on the basis of
history, geography, and human settlement Western Sahara was an inte-
gral part of Mauritania, and second, since 1962, Mauritania had sub-
scribed to the principle of self-determination for the people of Western
Sahara.47 Mauritania perceived no conflict between itself and Morocco
regarding claims to Western Sahara, noting that Morocco's claims were'
based on objective reasons, which Mauritania supported, and that each
recognized the rights of the other within its respective sphere of
influence.
Mauritania echoed Morocco's concern about a referendum in West-
ern Sahara, citing the lack of trained personnel and the nomadic char-
Sahara's economic wealth, :
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The Visiting Mission identified at least four political groups and lib-
eration movements operating in Western Sahara or in refugee camps.
Some of these groups claimed support among refugees and political
exiles in Morocco and Mauritania. The Visiting Mission focused on
the two major political organizations in Western Sahara: the Partido
de la Uni6n Nacional Saharui (PUNS) and the Frente POLISARIO.
4 9
Prior to the arrival of the Visiting Mission, the degree of popular sup-
port for the Frente POLISARIO had not been determined. However,
in all the cities on the itinerary of the Visiting Mission, the Frente
POLISARIO successfully organized massive demonstrations in support
of the independence movement.50 The success of these demonstrations
led the Visiting Mission to conclude
that there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the
Territory in favor of independence and opposing integration with any
neighbouring country. The differences of opinion which the Mission en-
countered were concerned not with the objective, but with the means by
which it should be achieved and the support given to rival political
movements.51
B. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara
All of the parties to the Western Sahara conflict did not concur in the
necessity for an advisory opinion. Spain argued that the Court should
refuse to render an advisory opinion and advanced two grounds in sup-
port of its claim: (1) Morocco's circumvention of the requirement of
consent for a contentious proceeding and (2) the inconsequential na-
ture of the questions to the decolonization of Western Sahara.5 2
In support of the claim that Morocco circumvented the requirement
of consent, Spain offered into evidence a letter from King Hassan II to
the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting a joint submission
to the Court of the legal issues concerning title to Western Sahara.5 3
The Court dismissed this evidence. It stated that because Spain was a
member of the U.N. and had accepted the provisions of the U.N. Char-
ter and the Statute of the Court, it had freely given its consent to the
exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction.5 4 The Court then pro-
ceeded to discuss the indispensable function it must perform to assist
49. For a more complete discussion of the Visiting Mission's observations and conclu-
sions regarding political organizations in Western Sahara, see Id. at 60-65.
50. For a more complete discussion of the Visiting Mission's observations and conclu-
sions regarding popular demonstrations, see id. at 60-67.
51. Id. at 48.
52. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 21.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 24.
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the General Assembly in the discharge of its duties, concluding it
would not refuse to render an advisory opinion based on Spain's claim
of Moroccan subterfuge.
55
In support of the claim that the questions were of an inconsequential
nature, Spain argued that the General Assembly had addressed the
right of the Saharwi people to self-determination in previous resolu-
tions. The Court rejected this alternative ground, sustaining the propri-
ety of its rendering an advisory opinion.5 6 Nevertheless, the Court
implicitly recognized the futility of its task and the dangerous conse-
quences of its Advisory Opinion for the decolonization process in
Western Sahara when it declared that the right of the Saharwi people
to self-determination constituted a basic assumption of the questions
before it.57
For the purpose of Question I of the Advisory Opinion, the "time of
colonization by Spain" was found to be 1884 when Spain proclaimed
its protectorate over the Rio de Oro.5 8 The Court referred to the law in
force at that time to determine the meaning of terra nullius. According
to state practice in 1884, territories inhabited by tribes or people having
any degree of social and political organization were not considered
terra null/us and hence not ripe for occupation. To acquire sovereignty
over such areas agreements had to be concluded with the local rulers.
The Court found that, at the time of colonization, the peoples of West-
ern Sahara were socially and politically organized under tribes compe-
tent to represent them, and that Spain concluded a valid agreement on
December 26, 1884 with the chiefs of the local tribes.59 The answer to
the first question was in the negative and, in accordance with the terms
of Resolution 3292(XXIX), the Court addressed itself to the question of
the legal ties of the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania. The Court
construed the words "legal ties" in light of the purposes of Resolution
3292(XXIX) and concluded that "legal ties" meant such ties as might
affect the policy to be followed in the decolonization of Western
Sahara.6
0
Morocco presented its claim to legal ties with Western Sahara as a
claim of sovereignty based on immemorial possession and an uninter-
rupted exercise of authority.6' The Court construed Question II to im-
55. Id. at 27.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Id. at 36.
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id. at 42.
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ply a finding of sovereignty based on an effective display of authority in
Western Sahara at the time of colonization and in the immediately
preceeding period. Morocco's attempt to prove sovereignty was based
on certain international acts and treaties that Morocco claimed evinced
recognition by other States of its sovereignty over all or part of Western
Sahara. The court rejected Morocco's position and found that the ties
presented did not amount to legal ties of sovereignty between Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. 62
When considering Mauritania's claim, the Court confronted a
threshold problem of defining the "Mauritanian entity." The term de-
noted the cultural, geographic, and social entity within which the Is-
lamic Republic of Mauritania was eventually to be created.63 The
Court found that, although there were certain ties of a racial, religious,
linguistic, cultural, and economic nature, the tribes and emirates in the
entity were independent of each other. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, at the time of colonization by Spain, there did not exist between
the Territory of Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity any tie of
sovereignty, allegiance of tribes, or membership in the same legal
entity."
In spite of the existence at the time of colonization of legal ties of
allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living
in Western Sahara and of some rights constituting legal ties between
the Mauritanian entity and Western Sahara, the Court held that neither
of these findings established such legal ties as might affect the de-
colonization of Western Sahara or, in particular, the principle of self-
determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of
the Saharwi people.65
The Advisory Opinion, the propriety of which was in doubt from the
moment it was discussed in the Fourth Committee, quashed whatever
hopes Morocco and Mauritania had concerning the legal validity of
their territorial claims. The right of the Saharwi people to self-determi-
nation was juridically affirmed as the paramount legal principle to ap-
ply in the decolonization of Western Sahara.
C. The 'nnexation" of Western Sahara
After the Court rendered its Advisory Opinion, King Hassan II
threatened to conduct a "Green March" into Western Sahara with
62. Id. at 56-57.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id. at 68.
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350,000 Moroccan civilians.66 Hassan characterized the March as a
peaceful means by which Morocco could achieve international recogni-
tion of its right to national unity and territorial integrity.67 The ulti-
mate purpose of the March, however, appears to have been to pressure
Spain into negotiating with Mauritania and Morocco concerning sover-
eignty over Western Sahara before the General Assembly could make
the necessary preparations for the referendum in the Territory.
Spain, in response to Hassan's threat and in accordance with Article
35 of the Charter, urged the President of the Security Council to con-
vene an emergency meeting. Madrid sought to dissuade Hassan from
proceeding with the March on the grounds that it would jeopardize
international peace and security, violate the right of the Saharwi people
to self-determination, and contravene the purposes of the Charter.
68
Pursuant to Spain's request, the Security Council called on Morocco to
desist from the proposed March on Western Sahara.69 The report of
the Secretary-General pursuant to this Resolution indicated that Spain
was not committed to seeking a solution to the crisis in Western Sahara
on a bilateral or trilateral basis.
70
Interstate tension concerning Western Sahara did not abate, and, as
a result, the Security Council on November 2, 1975, adopted Resolu-
tion 379(1975), 71 reiterating its previous decision, to the effect that all
parties interested and concerned should avoid taking any action, uni-
lateral or otherwise, that would further escalate tension in Western Sa-
hara. The report of the Secretary-General pursuant to this Resolution
evinced the effects of Moroccan pressure on Spain-the Madrid gov-
ernment indicated that it would now favor a trilateral agreement if the
U.N. agreed to accept it.72
Nonetheless, two Security Council Resolutions were not sufficient to
dissuade Hassan. Bowing to the pressure of Moroccan nationalists, he
ordered the commencement of the Green March on November 6,
1975. 73 In response to this action, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 380(1975) on the same day.74 It deplored the March and called
66. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
67. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 17, U.N. Doc. S/I 1852 (1975).
68. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 17, U.N. Doc. S/11851 (1975).
69. 30 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/377 (1975).
70. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 27, 28, U.N. Doc. S/I 1863 (1975).
71. 30 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/379 (1975).
72. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 33, U.N. Doc. S/11874 (1975).
73. The Green March brought denunciations of Morocco's actions in subsequent meet-
ings of the Fourth Committee. See, e.g., 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2173d-2182d mtgs.), U.N.
Docs. A/C.4/30/SR.2173-2182 (1975).
74. 30 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/380 (1975).
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upon Morocco to withdraw all of the participants from Western Sa-
hara. That same day, Morocco informed Spain that the March into
Western Sahara would continue unless Madrid agreed to bilateral ne-
gotiations concerning a transfer of sovereignty over Western Sahara
from Spain to Morocco. 75
Consequently, Madrid entered into negotiations with Morocco and
Mauritania. On November 14, 1975, Spain agreed to terminate its
presence in Western Sahara by February 28, 1976. By then, the powers
and responsibilities of administering the Territory would have been
transferred to a "temporary" administration controlled by Morocco
and Mauritania. 76 Pursuant to the Madrid Agreement, Western Sahara
was partitioned: Morocco annexed the northern two-thirds of the Ter-
ritory and granted control of the southern third to Mauritania. 77
In response to this unfortunate but foreseeable chain of events, the
General Assembly, on December 10, 1975, adopted Resolution
3458(XXX).78 The Resolution, which was divided into two parts, is the
General Assembly's most perplexing statement on Western Sahara.
Part A reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara
.to self-determination within a framework that guaranteed and permit-
ted them the free and genuine expression of their will, and requested
Spain to "take immediately all necessary measures, in consultation
with all the parties concerned and interested, so that all Saharans
originating in the Territory may exercise fully and freely under United
Nations supervision their inalienable right to self-determination. ' 79
Part B took note of the Madrid Agreement, reaffirmed the inalienable
right of the Saharan people to self-determination and requested the
"interim administration to take all necessary steps to ensure that all the
Saharan population originating in the Territory will be able to exercise
their inalienable right to self-determination through free consultations
organized with the assistance of a representative of the United Nations
appointed by the Secretary-General." 80
75. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 31, U.N. Doc. S/1 1871 (1975). But see re-
sponse at 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 32, U.N. Doc. S/I 1873 (1975).
76. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 41, U.N. Doc. S/I 1880, Annex 111 (1975).
The contents of the Madrid Agreement have never been disclosed. It is, however, believed
that in exchange for transferring "sovereignty" over Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauri-
tania, Spain received a substantial percentage interest in the phosphate mines at Bu Craa.
77. Morocco and Mauritania officially delimited the frontier in Western Sahara on April
14, 1976. See Letter dated May 17, 1976, from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June
1976) 25, U.N. Doc. A/31/91-S/12076 (1976).
78. G.A. Res. 3458,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 116-17, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975),
79. Id. Part A, para. 7.
80. Id. Part B, para. 4.
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The schizophrenic character of this Resolution reflected the General
Assembly's confusion about the decolonization of Western Sahara. In
Part A, the General Assembly paid lip service to its previous commit-
ment to self-determination for colonial peoples, while in Part B it ex-
plicitly recognized the so-called fait accompli of the parties to the
Madrid Agreement, an invalid transfer of title under accepted stan-
dards of international law and U.N. practice.81
In addition, Resolution 3458(XXX) failed to refer to the referendum
that had been the impetus for eight previous resolutions on Western
Sahara. In its place was the language of "free consultations," reminis-
cent of an "act of free choice" held in West Irian during 1969 that the
General Assembly accepted as a valid expression of the will of the colo-
nial people concerned.
82
D. The Founding of the Saharuie Arab Democratic Republic
In a dramatic early morning ceremony in the Sahara on February 28,
1976, the Frente POLISARIO declared the establishment of the
Saharuie Arab Democratic Republic, the same day as the "effective"
transfer date of the Madrid Agreement.8 3 This event was the culmina-
81. The right of colonial peoples to self-determination is a principle,/us cogens, of inter-
national law. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically invali-
dates any agreement concluded in violation of ajus cogens rule. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(1969). Thejus cogens nature of the right to self-determination has been disputed by at least
one author who asserts that the right of self-determination may be protected by the pacta
tertiis rule. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 79-81, 366.
The Madrid Agreement was an invalid exercise of power by Spain under accepted U.N.
practice. According to the past application of Chapter XI of the Charter, Spain may transfer
its administrative responsibilities for Western Sahara only to the people of the Territory or
to the U.N. The territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania confer no right to exercise
authority over the Territory unless the General Assembly recognizes the validity of those
claims and their superiority to the right of the colonial people to self-determination. Spain
could have entered a legitimate agreement to dispose of the Territory only if it had exercised
sovereignty over Western Sahara. It is, however, often said that Administering States are,
iosofacto, not sovereign with respect to their Chapter XI territories. A. RIGO-SUREDA,
supra note 17, at 33; Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 42. To the extent that sovereignty implies
the unfettered right to control, or dispose of, the territory in question, the obligations of
Article 73b of the Charter and the principle of self-determination substantially limit the
sovereignty of an Administering State. See Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975]
I.C.J. 12, 145 (separate opinion of Judge de Castro).
82. G.A. Res. 2504,24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 3, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). With
the adoption of this resolution, the General Assembly took note of an "act of free choice" in
the Territory, conducted while an occupying State, which had asserted a claim to the Terri-
tory, exercised tight political control over the indigenous population.
83. The relevant documents and memoranda relating to the founding of the SADR can
be found in T. HULTMAN, Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara, in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF
DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIONTIES (1978). The documents include: The Consti-
tution of the Provisional National Saharan Council, Proclamation of the Democratic Arab
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tion, or nearly so, of the efforts of the Frente POLISARIO, an organi-
zation dedicated to the creation of an independent Saharan State in the
former Territory of Western Sahara.84
The SADR is an Islamic Republic. Islam is the State's religion and
its source of law. Arabic is the official national language.85 The
boundaries of the SADR are the Saguia El Hamra and the Rio de
Oro.86 The governmental functions of the SADR are vested in three
branches: an Executive Council, a Legislative Body, and a Judicial
System. The supreme organ of executive power is the Revolutionary
Command Council, presided over by the Secretary-General of the
Frente POLISARIO, which has the power to appoint a Council of
Ministers.k Legislative and consultative power are vested in a 41-
member Saharan National Council.88 Judicial power is vested in a Ju-
diciary Council consisting of the Presidents of the Tribunals and pre-
sided over by the Minister of Justice.89 The tribunal system consists of
primary tribunals, a court of appeals, a Supreme Court of the People,
and the State Security Court.90 Chapter V of the SADR Constitution
provides that the Executive Committee of the Frente POLISARIO will
fulfill the duties of the Revolutionary Command Council until the first
general popular congress is held after the recovery of national
sovereignty. 91
E. International Developments
In the midst of the war of national liberation, the Council of Minis-
ters of the Organization of African Unity, on July 15, 1976, reaffirmed
the inalienable right of the Saharwi people to self-determination and
independence and called for a solution to the crisis that would be ac-
ceptable to all interested and concerned parties, including the Saharwi
people, within the context of African unity.92 The Fourth Committee
Republic of the Sahara, a Frente POLISARIO Memorandum, and the Constitution of the
Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara.
84. See Report of the Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3, at 62. There is a
distinction between "declaring" a State and "establishing" a State. A State may be "de-
clared" but be prevented from being "established" because of external factors. In this re-
gard, the declaration of the SADR was not wholly effective because of the Moroccan
occupation.
85. SADR CONST. art. 3.
86. Id. art. 1.
87. Id. arts. 12-14.
88. Id. art. 21.
89. Id. art. 24.
90. Id. arts. 28, 29.
91. Id. art. 31.
92. Resolution Adopted at the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of
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of the General Assembly in November, 1976 drafted a resolution that
recalled Resolution 3412(XXX) regarding cooperation between the
U.N. and O.A.U. and postponed consideration of Western Sahara until
the Thirty-Second Session of the General Assembly.93
The year 1977 brought no movement in the positions of the parties to
the Saharan conflict. Then, in July, 1978, the 15th Ordinary Session of
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U.
adopted a resolution establishing an ad hoc committee of at least five
heads of State-members of O.A.U.-to study "all the data" in the
Western Sahara dispute, including the exercise of the peoples' right to
self-determination, in preparation for an extraordinary summit to dis-
cuss the issue.94 In October, 1978, reports indicated that Morocco and
Mauritania had accepted the mediation of theAdhoc Committee in an
effort to solve the problem of Western Sahara.95
The Ad hoc Committee began its work on November 30, 1978, at
Khartoum.96 On December 2, 1978, the Ad hoc Committee announced
the formation of a subcommittee with a mandate to visit the region,
contact all the parties concerned, including "the Saharan people," and
to undertake necessary measures for restoring peace and security.
97
The Committee appealed to all parties to adhere to an immediate
cease-fire in order to enable the subcommittee to accomplish its
duties.98
In December, 1978, the General Assembly reconsidered Western Sa-
hara and adopted a resolution that noted the efforts of the O.A.U. and
resurrected the language of Resolutions 2983(XXVII) and
3162(XXVIII) to the effect that it recognized the inalienable right of the
Saharwi people to self-determination and independence. 99
On April 30, 1979, the O.A.U. subcommittee visited Algeria, Mo-
rocco, and Mauritania and met with representatives of the Frente
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 81
(XIII), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/31/136, Annex 11 (1976).
93. G.A. Res. 3412,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 5, U.N. Doc. A/L.767/Rev.2 (1975).
Fourth Committee decision in U.N. Doc. A/31/136 (1976).
94. Resolution Adopted at the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 92
(XV), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/33/235, Annex II (1978).
95. 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at 106.
96. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/33/364 (1978).
97. 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at 107.
98. d.
99. G.A. Res. 3162, 28 U.N. GAOR, I Supp. (No. 30) 110, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973);
G.A. Res. 33/31, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 172, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
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POLISARIO in Algiers.'10 On June 26, 1979, the Ad hoc Committee
issued a communique stating that it had adopted certain recommenda-
tions of the subcommittee concerning the exercise of the right to self-
determination by the people of Western Sahara and the modalities of
its exercise.' 0' The recommendations, submitted to the O.A.U. Assem-
bly at its 16th Ordinary Session in July, 1979 were adopted in a deci-
sion wherein the Assembly:
1) called for a general and immediate cease-fire;
2) decided that the Saharan people would exercise their right to self-
determination in a general and free referendum that would enable them
to choose either total independence or maintenance of the status quo;
3) decided to convene a meeting of all parties concerned, including the
representative of Western Sahara, to request their cooperation for the im-
plementation of the decision; and
4) established a special committee of six member States of OAU to work
out the modalities and to supervise the organization of [a] referendum
with the cooperation of the UN on the basis of universal suffrage. 10 2
Less than one month later, the government of Mauritania concluded a
peace agreement with the Frente POLISARIO in which Mauritania
pledged to cease hostilities against the Frente POLISARIO and with-
draw from the territory it had occupied. 10 3
In response to these events, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion on Western Sahara on November 21, 1979.104 It repeated the text
of the previous resolution and, for the first time in any General Assem-
bly resolution on Western Sahara, officially recognized the Frente
POLISARIO as the legitimate representative of the Saharan people. 05
This recognition by the General Assembly gave the Frente
POLISARIO standing to participate fully in any search for a just and
lasting political solution to the dispute. 0 6 Recognition of the Frente
POLISARIO as the legitimate representative of the Saharwi people
was tantamount to recognition of the primacy of this people's interest
in the decolonization of Western Sahara.
100. 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at 107.
101. Id.
102. Decision Adopted at the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec. 114
(XVI), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/34/483 (1979).
103. Text of Peace Agreement, reprinted in Special Committee on Decolonization, 34
U.N. GAOR (I 161st mtg.) 61, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/P.V.1161 (1979).
104. G.A. Res. 34/37, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 203, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).





A comprehensive theory of recognition must be related to the funda-
mental goals of contemporary international law. Hence, decisions
about recognition should select those elements of past decisions which
will contribute to minimum order and conditions of human dignity in
the future and reject those elements which never have contributed, or
will no longer contribute to the minimum and optimum goals of the
world community.107 In the case of Western Sahara, recognition of the
SADR government-in-exile would, in accordance with a constitutive
view of recognition, serve to sanction Morocco's non-conformity to a
peremptory international norm, the right of colonial peoples to self-
determination, and affirmatively hasten the complete decolonization of
the Territory. 0 8
Recognition as a theory in the practice of international law is either a
political act or a legal one, depending on the school of thought to which
the recognizing institution adheres. 0 9 Historically, learned jurists have
propounded two theories, or rather made two extreme assertions as to
the correct view of recognition: (1) the declaratory theory and (2) the
constitutive theory.
The declaratory theory holds that recognition is a declaration of ex-
isting fact. The factual criteria are, primarily, those delineated in the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:"10 a per-
manent population, a defined territory, a government, and capacity to
107. Reisman & Suzuki, Recognition and Social Change in International Law, in TO-
WARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 415 (W. REISMAN & B. WESTON eds. 1976).
108. Some jurists have asserted that recognition of governments is distinct from recogni-
tion of States. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 27-29. With respect to recognition of govern-
ments, it is not the existence of any particular facts that is important, but rather the single
fact of the new government's effective control and authority, with a reasonable prospect of
permanency, over the whole, or nearly the whole, territory of the State. H. LAUTERPACHT,
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1947). These arguments have some force with
respect to existing States. But, where nascent States are concerned, no separate recognition
is accorded to their government. In fact, the recognition of a new State is often accom-
plished by recognition of its government. T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOG-
NITION 101 (1951). Thus, recognition of the SADR government-in-exile as a new
government is at once recognition of the SADR as a new State.
109. The recognition of a new State, or of a new government of an existing State, is a
unilateral act which the recognizing government can grant or withhold. . . . While
States may regard it as desirable to follow certain legal principles in according or with-
holding recognition, the practice of States shows that the act of recognition is still re-
garded as essentially a political decision which each State decides in accordance with its
own free appreciation of the situation.
Memorandum of the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations,
5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-May, 1950) 19, U.N. Doe. S/1466 (1950).
110. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, T.S. No. 881. Lauterpacht thinks that the most important "fact" is not delineated in
the Montevideo Convention. Rather, he stresses the existence of an independent State, i.e., a
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enter into relations with other States. Thus, whenever the factual re-
quirements exist, the granting of recognition is said to be a matter of
legal duty. I I
The constitutive theory is stated as follows: "A State is, and becomes
an International Person through recognition only and exclusively." 112
That is, although a State may exist in fact, it does not exist in law until
recognized. Those institutions that adhere to this theory consider the
practice of recognition a means by which States can sanction non-con-
formity to international norms." 13
A. Premature Recognition
It can be argued that, due to the existence of armed conflict between
the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco, recognition of the SADR gov-
ernment-in-exile would be premature. 14 However, a careful examina-
tion of the doctrine of premature recognition reveals that it derives
from the notion of respect for the sovereignty of a parent State.115 Pre-
mature recognition is said to amount to a denial of the lawful sover-
eignty of a parent State actively engaged in asserting its authority
against insurgents in a civil conflict within its own territory. Premature
recognition is, therefore, an unlawful intervention in the domestic juris-
diction of a State."16
State with a government independent of any other State. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108,
at 45.
111. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 6. The declaratory theory claims to negate the
potential abuses of recognition as a political act by imposing upon the new State interna-
tional rights and obligations at the moment of birth, and imposing upon third States obliga-
tions owed to the new State. Yet, because fulfillment of the criteria is necessarily a factual
inquiry, political considerations may attach to the determination of the facts. Id. at 45.
Thus, there may arise situations where, even though a State has objectively fulfilled those
criteria, political reasons dictate withholding recognition, and vice versa. Compare the U.S,
observations regarding the qualifications for statehood with respect to the admission of
Israel to the U.N., 3 U.N. SCOR (383d mtg.) 10-11 (1948), with the U.S. policy regarding
recognition of Guinea-Bissau, Rouire, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 309 (1974).
112. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (7th ed. 1948).
113. It has been argued that acceptance of the constitutive theory causes a condition in
which the unrecognized State is neither protected by international law in certain essential
respects nor bound to respect the equally vital legal interests of States already established.
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 52.
114. Premature recognition may be defined as recognition conferred in spite of the ab-
sence of the facts necessary for its grant. S. PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS
57 (1959). The term includes recognition granted durante bei/o, when the outcome of the
struggle is yet uncertain. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 8. Recognition is not prema-
ture when the entity seeking recognition enjoys a tangible measure of success accompanied
by a reasonable prospect of permanency. Id. at 12.
115. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 8.
116. S. PATEL, supra note 114, at 60.
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In the context of Western Sahara, this argument is without force.
The Frente POLISARIO is not engaged in armed conflict with Spain,
the former metropolitan State.' 1 7 It is engaged in armed conflict with
Morocco, a State that legitimately can claim no relationship with West-
ern Sahara other than contiguity. Thus, recognition of the SADR gov-
ernment-in-exile would not deny to a parent State its lawful
sovereignty over personal territory because no parent State is involved,
nor exists.' 18
The doctrine of premature recognition, however, need not be nar-
rowly applied. It is equally valid and generally applicable to any situa-
tion in which a political community asserts a claim to recognition.
According to this view, the doctrine has some bearing on the separate
question of the right of a political community to claim recognition by
third States and to the duty of third States to grant recognition. " 9 Pre-
mature recognition in this instance is said to be an abuse of the power
of recognition in respect of a community which does not exist factually
or independently yet seeks to be given a status that it does not pos-
sess.' 20 Unless the political community seeking recognition can boast
of a reasonably certain and permanent existence and has achieved
political solidarity, this view holds that it is both imprudent and illegal
to grant recognition.'
2'
An objective appraisal of the political climate in Western Sahara
reveals that the SADR government-in-exile has satisfied at least one of
the conditions necessary to characterize a grant of recognition to a nas-
cent political community as legal. The Frente POLISARIO has
achieved a high degree of political solidarity both within and without
Western Sahara. 22 Regarding the remaining condition, "a reasonably
certain and permanent existence," the inherently amorphous nature of
this standard makes it susceptible to as many different interpretations
as there are States in the world-interpretations which have been and
will continue to be heavily influenced by political considerations.
Moreover, the permanent existence of the SADR depends on myriad
political decisions that will be made by third States. It cannot, there-
fore, fairly be said that the "reasonably certain and permanent exist-
117. Spain officially terminated its presence in Western Sahara on February 28, 1976,
pursuant to the terms of the Madrid Agreement. 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1976)
107, U.N. Doc. S/1 1997 (1976). See note 76 supra.
118. See note 81 supra.
119. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 11.
120. S. PATEL, supra note 114, at 60.
121. Id. at 61.
122. See text accompanying notes 230-38 infra.
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ence" standard stands as a bar to any grant of recognition to the SADR
government-in-exile. If a State determines, for reasons political or
otherwise, that there exists a reasonable certainty that the SADR will
survive the Moroccan occupation, and proceeds to recognize the SADR
government-in-exile, such a grant of recognition is clearly legitimate.
B. Recognition of Belligerency and Insurgency
Recognition of the SADR government-in-exile must also be distin-
guished from recognition of belligerency and insurgency. 123 Both
forms of recognition presuppose an incumbent government and an in-
surgent group, and are only applicable where the insurgent group at-
tempts to acquire control over all or part of the territory of the
incumbent government. 124 The armed conflict in such a situation is
within the domestic jurisdiction of the incumbent government. Ac-
cordingly, the development of the law of recognition of belligerency
has attempted to accommodate to the sovereign interests of the incum-
bent government, particularly those interests that relate to the legality
of foreign assistance to the insurgent group.1 25 Community response to
123. Insurgency has been defined as the state of political revolt or insurrection in a State
that falls short of civil war, S. PATEL, supra note 114, at 92, or more recently as a twilight
zone between rebellion and belligerency, Farer, Foreign Intervention in CIGilArmed Conflict,
142 RECUEIL DES COURS 318 (1974). Some jurists regard any distinction between the recog-
nition of insurgency and belligerency as fictitious. Lauterpacht states:
International law knows of no 'recognition of insurgency' as an act conferring upon
insurgents international rights following from a well-defined status. That insurgency
has been recognized in any given case means that specific rights have been created ...
It does not create a status from which further and more general rights may be deduced.
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 270-71. See also I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 164-65 (1965). Belligerency describes a situation in which rebellion within a State
achieves such dimension and intensity that its repercussions or effects are felt beyond the
frontiers of the State in question and directly affect other States. When this point is reached,
the matter ceases to be one of domestic concern and may become one that international law
takes cognizance of and seeks to regulate. S. PATEL, supra note 114, at 87. Certain factual
conditions must exist in order to permit a foreign State's recognition of belligerents:
a) there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished from a
purely local) character, b) the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial portion
of national territory; c) the insurgents must conduct hostilities in accordance with the rules
of war and through organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority; and
d) there must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to define their
attitude by means of recognition of the belligerency. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at
176.
124. 'Incumbent government' designates a government which has already exercised
sovereignty over the State's territory and which continues to exercise it over at least a
part of the territory. Some cases may arise where no government meets these criteria.
In such cases, the 'vacuum' will be filled by a hasty recognition of one faction as
'incumbent.'
Krauss, Internal Conflicts and Foreign States: In Search of the State of the Law, 5 YALE
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 173, 178 n.19 (1979).
125. For a more complete discussion of the law of belligerency, see id.
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the cases of the Republic of Biafra and the Provisional Government of
Algeria, although not directly analogous to the case of the SADR gov-
ernment-in-exile, illustrate the application of this doctrine in a non-
colonial and colonial context, respectively.
126
In the context of Western Sahara, legal rules regarding recognition of
belligerency and insurgency do not apply. The Frente POLISARIO is
not an insurgent group seeking to acquire control over the territory of
an incumbent government because no incumbent government of West-
ern Sahara can be said to exist. 127 Moreover, decolonization issues
arising under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter are not within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any State. 28 By its very nature, the conflict in
Western Sahara is of international cognizance; labels of belligerency or
insurgency are inappropriate.
C. Recognition of Governments-in-Exile
Recognition of a government-in-exile logically presupposes the exist-
ence of a State from which the government claiming recognition was
forced to flee.129 In this regard, it can be argued that, because, the
SADR was not a State prior to the Moroccan occupation, the SADR
government-in-exile may not now claim to be the legitimate govern-
ment of the SADR. But, in the context of decolonization, otherwise
valid rules of law based on conventional wisdom must yield to the spe-
cial circumstances of colonial rule. A Non-Self-Governing Territory
126. During the Nigerian Civil War, five Third World States recognized the Republic of
Biafra. No State formally accorded the Biafran insurgents the status of belligerents. Moti-
vated by considerations of sovereignty, the O.A.U. favored Nigeria's claims to preservation
of national unity and territorial integrity against the Biafran claim to self-determination.
See Ijalaye, Was "Biafra' at Any Time a State in International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 551
(1971). After having been recognized by various States, the Provisional Government of Al-
geria claimed that French acquiescence in many of its actions amounted to recognition of
belligerent status. The Provisional Goverment argued that this recognition of belligerent
status and the denunciation of the Atlantic Pact constituted legal grounds sufficient to com-
pel the cessation of unlawful intervention by the Atlantic Powers in support of France in the
Franco-Algerian conflict. M. BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 142-80
(1961).
127. If one must choose an "incumbent government," from among the parties to the
Saharan conflict, the Frente POLISARIO is logical; the equities clearly favor it. In the past,
liberation movements have become "incumbent" governments. Krauss, supra note 124, at
221 n.174.
128. RL HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLIT-
ICAL ORGANS OF THE U.N. 103 (1963).
129. Marek considers governments-in-exile as the surviving organs of the regularly con-
stituted surviving legal order of the relevant States. She would affirm the organic character
of the government only where it had been properly constituted in its own country and had
simply transferred its activities abroad, with no break in its legal or actual continuity, fol-
lowing the total occupation of its territory. K. MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF
STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1968).
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under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter is by definition one in which the
people "have not yet attained a full measure of self-government."'
30
The requirement of a prior-existing State from which the properly con-
stituted government claiming recognition fled may not be applied to
Western Sahara. To accept the fact of the objective "non-existence" of
the SADR as a valid basis for refusing to recognize the SADR govern-
ment-in-exile as the legal sovereign in the former Territory of Western
Sahara would accord legal consequences to Morocco's illegal
occupation.13
Recognition of governments-in-exile has occurred in the past.
Though the conditioning factors that necessitated and justified recogni-
tion of those governments are not fully duplicated here, the theoretical
framework for the recognition suggests a proper response to the Frente
POLISARIO's claim to recognition for the SADR government-in-exile,
The SADR government-in-exile is a government suigeneris, and analy-
sis of past practice regarding recognition of governments-in-exile can
be instructive but not authoritative.
During both World Wars, recognition was accorded to governments-
in-exile dispossessed of their territory. Such recognition was defended
primarily on the theory that belligerent occupation does not extinguish
the identity and continuity of a State and its organs.132
During World War I, governments of some States that had been
overrun by Germany physically existed on foreign soil. The Belgian
government operated at Le Havre, France during the entire period of
German occupation.' 33 Similarly, the exiled Serbian government, ac-
companied by the diplomatic corps, established itself in Corfu, and
continued its military and political activities fully recognized and sup-
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
131. "It is not the existence and recurrence of illegal acts that present any danger to
international law, but rather the absence of sanction particularly as expressed in the law-
creating capacity of such acts. . .[and] the possibility of their giving rise to legal titles on
equal footing with lawful acts." K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 554. Lauterpacht agreed:
"illegal acts cannot produce legal results beneficial to the wrongdoer." H. LAUTERPACHT,
supra note 108, at 413.
132. Marek argues that "recognition," is not the proper terminology to describe the
treatment of exiled governments: "[t]he exiled governments in London during World War
II were not new subjects of international law and hence the question of recognition per se
was not raised. Indeed, a grant of recognition was quite unnecessary on the assumption that
the occupied States and their organs abroad retain their identity. . . ." K. MAREK, supra
note 129, at 91. "Thus what is termed 'recognition' is in reality affirming their continuity in
the face of proclamations of their extinction by the occupying power." Id. at 438.
133. The diplomatic corps followed the government to Saint-Adresse. The impossibility
of convening the Belgian Parliament was met by Royal Decree. The Belgian army was




ported by the Allies.134 And the Czechoslovak National Council was
recognized as the defacto belligerent government endowed with proper
authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czechs, al-
though the territory of the new State was under the control of Austria-
Hungary.135
The governments of eight European countries operated in exile in
London during World War 1I.136 Their territories had been overrun by
Nazi Germany, a belligerent occupation sensu strictu, ie., occupation
effected during actual hostilities on the strength of military seizure of
territory and not on a conventional basis. 137 Relevant articles of the
Hague Convention of 1907,138 as interpreted, indicate that a State's
identity and continuity are not affected by belligerent occupation of its
territory, that territorial changes undertaken by the occupant are inva-
lid, that the nationality of the population is unaffected, that local au-
thorities established in the occupied territory by the occupant State do
not enjoy sovereignty, and that the occupation itself is only provisional
and temporary. In other words, the belligerent occupant can only in-
terfere with the practical working of the legal order of the occupied
State; but whether that legal order is able to develop and operate, or
whether it is technically prevented from doing so, it continues to be
valid and to exist.' 39
134. Id. at 87, 237-62.
135. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-08 (1940).
136. The eight exiled governments were those of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Lux-
embourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia. See generally Oppenheimer,
Governments and-Authoritles in Exile, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 568 (1942); Brown, Sovereignty in
Exile, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1941).
137. K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 75.
138. Hague Convention of 1907, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. Articles 42
and 43 are relevant:
Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the author-
ity of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such author-
ity has been established and can be exercised.
Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of
the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore and ensure as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.
See also K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 75-79.
139. K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 80. A distinction must be made here between bellig-
erent occupation and defacto government. A defacto government is a consequence of inter-
nal disturbances or civil wars, whereas belligerent occupation results from international
conflict. A defacto government can claim international recognition when it has firmly es-
tablished itself, while belligerent occupation is provisional by nature. Finally, a defacto
government tends to substitute a new government for that of its political adversaries; bellig-
erent occupation, on the other hand, leaves the sovereignty of the occupied State intact. To
mistake belligerent occupation for a defacto government would mean treating the occupied
State as annexed, its continuity as interrupted, its identity as lost, and its personality as
merged into the occupant's. Id. at 82-83.
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These governments exercised all of the rights of sovereignty that they
had exercised in their respective territories prior to the occupAtion and
nine sovereign governments thus operated from the same territorial
base.' 40 They enacted legislation,' 41 entered into treaty relations be-
tween themselves and third States, 142 established maritime courts,
43
maintained armed forces, 144 enjoyed diplomatic privileges and immu-
nities, 45 and administered colonial possessions.146 Insofar as enforce-
ment of their legislative decrees was concerned, the exiled governments
had to look to the courts and authorities of the territorial sovereign for
support and cooperation in giving them effect.
147
Community response to the belligerent occupation of Europe by
Nazi Germany, and in particular the decision to recognize the exiled
governments in London, are examples of creative State exploitation of
international norms when confronted with clearly illegal situations.
Specifically, the peremptory principles of the continuity of occupied
States and the continuity of the organic character of their respective
governments properly constituted, relegated to the background the
otherwise critical factor in a recognition decision--effectiveness of a
government within a territory.148 In addition, these overriding princi-
ples easily cured any minor flaws in the internal legality of an exiled
140. Such a state of affairs violates no norm of customary international law so long as
the governments-in-exile have the consent of the territorial State. "A state cannot exercise
rights of sovereignty in the territory of another state without the latter's consent." Oppen-
heimer, supra note 136, at 594. Here, the eight governments-in-exile had acquired the con-
sent of the British government.
141. For a more complete discussion of the legislative activity of the exiled governments,
see id. at 584-86.
The mere fact that a foreign Government has been deprived of the control of a part
or the whole of its territory by an enemy in no way invalidates legislation passed, or
other acts of sovereignty done, by it outside its normal territory, provided that its consti-
tutional law contains no insuperable obstacle to the validity of such legislation or other
sovereign acts and provided that [His Majesty] continues to recognize it as the dejure
Government and recognizes no other Government as the defacto sovereign.
A. McNAIR, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 357 (3d ed. 1948).
Where the constitution of a State is silent with respect to the power to enact legislation
and issue decrees on foreign soil, it should be interpreted to protect the vital interests of the
State and its people. Oppenheimer, supra note 136, at 582.
142. For a more complete discussion of the treaty-making power of the exiled govern-
ments, see Oppenheimer, supra note 136, at 577-78.
143. Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 21.
144. Allied Forces Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 51.
145. Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 7. For a more com-
plete discussion of the diplomatic activities of the exiled governments, see Oppenheimer,
supra note 136, at 576-77.
146. Brown, supra note 136, at 667.
147. Oppenheimer, supra note 136, at 587.
148. For a more complete discussion of the effectiveness requirement, see H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 108, at 98-102; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 123, at 148-49.
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government properly constituted prior to the transfer of its activities
abroad.149 The legal title of such governments was ultimately based on
the fact that they left their respective countries as regular, legitimate
State organs. 150
Where an exiled government had never exercised any rights of sover-
eignty within the territorial boundaries of the occupied State and was
in fact created on foreign soil, it could only claim a revolutionary basis
for its existence. The requirement of effectiveness was not irrelevant
here; by definition, such a government failed to satisfy the require-
ment.' 5' Consequently, these governments were accorded a provisional
recognition pending the confirmation of their claim on their return to
their home countries. 152
Thus, the method of recognizing the exiled government and the sig-
nificance of the requirement of effectiveness were made dependent on
whether the exiled government in question was properly constituted
prior to the belligerent occupation of its territory and the subsequent
transfer of its activities abroad. Where the government in question was
properly constituted prior to the transfer of its activities abroad, effec-
tiveness of the exiled government within its territory was wholly irrele-
vant. In the case of a government constituted on foreign soil, the
effectiveness of the exiled government within its territory strengthened
its claim to recognition and was an important factor in determining the
propriety of a grant of recognition. 53 Moreover, regarding the matter
of legal continuity, the uninterrupted legal continuity of an exiled gov-
ernment was not indispensable to the international continuity of its
State. It was, however, indispensable to the continuity of the organic
character of the government within the context of the previously ex-
isting constitutional system. 154
The experience of the exiled governments during the World Wars
represents a tangible illustration of the dynamic aspect of the principle
of the continuity of occupied States and its corollary principle of the
149. Such was the case with the Dutch and Belgian governments-in-exile. See K.
MAREK, supra note 129, at 97-98.
150. Id. at 97.
151. "[I]n certain circumstances, a limited degree of effectiveness may be achieved by a
revolutionary government in exile. It may consist in its ability to rally around itself all, or
the great majority of, its nationals abroad, to organize armed forces and other State organs,"
or in any other connection between the exiled government and the occupied territory. K.
MAREK, supra note 129, at 314.
152. Such was the nature of the recognition granted to the French National Committee
and the Czech government. Id. at 99, 311-24.
153. Id. at 313-14.
154. Id. at 98.
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continuity of the organic character of exiled State governments. One
ought to restrict a rigid application of the legal rules that emanate from
these principles to those cases in which a sovereign, independent State
existed prior to the belligerent occupation. Such a restriction is justi-
fied considering that the theory from which these principles derive as-
sumes an unbroken, organic link between the exiled governments and
the States they represented.1 55 Thus, in the context of decolonization
and self-determination, the otherwise critical requirement of a govern-
ment's effectiveness within its territory as a precondition to recognition
must yield to the peremptory principle of the right of colonial peoples
to self-determination. 56 Where the colonial people in question were,
by belligerent occupation of their territory by a foreign State, prevented
from exercising their right to self-determination, this result is particu-
larly desirable. In accordance with the teachings of both World Wars,
a creative community response to the current situation in Western Sa-
hara would not permit the lack of effectiveness of the SADR govern-
ment-in-exile to defeat that government's claim to recognition. 57 The
right of a colonial people to self-determination, particularly where they
have attempted a partial exercise of their right by forming a State and
constituting a government, cannot be permitted to be defeated by a
rigid interpretation and application of otherwise valid principles of in-
ternational law.
Yet how long can it be said that the legal identity of a State and its
exiled government are preserved, despite the lack of effective control, in
a situation of effective but illegal annexation? For Marek, the final loss
of independence, either by way of a legal settlement or by way of a
total obliteration of the entire delimitation of a State, signifies its ex-
tinction.' 58 For Brown, "so long as a people do not accept military
conquest, so long as they can manifest, in one way or another, their
inalterable will to regain their freedom, their sovereignty, even though
flouted, restricted, and sent into exile, still persists."' 59 Whatever the
answer to the question, the undeniable fact remains that, in view of the
155. Id. at 87. The Hague Convention of 1907 and the subsequent Geneva Conventions
are based on or incorporate this theory. Id. at 78-79, 116.
156. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 102-03, 261-62, where he asserts that the effec-
tiveness precondition to recognition of the secessionist entity is relaxed where the metropoli-
tan State forcibly prevents self-determination. The experiences of Algeria and Guinea-
Bissau are examples. Id. at 259-61.
157. If the effectiveness of the SADR government-in-exile is measured against the stan-
dard adopted by Marek for revolutionary governments-in-exile, see note 151 supra, it is
clear that the SADR government-in-exile has achieved a considerable degree of effective-
ness. See text accompanying notes 230-38 infra.
158. K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 589.
159. Brown, supra note 136, at 667.
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uncertain future of the Saharan conflict, the practice States and other
international institutions adopt toward recognition assumes considera-
ble importance.' 60
III. Claims Relating to Participation
In addition to formal declarations, recognition manifests itself in var-
ious forms. It may be either express or implied. 161 Recognition may
also be said to be conditional-e., a State may accord recognition to
an entity that has not, in its view, fulfilled one of the prerequisites of
statehood, 62 with knowledge that the other prerequisites are fulfilled
and on the condition that the remaining prerequisites be achieved
within a reasonable period of time.' 63 Such was the case with United
States recognition of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile during
World War II.64 Yet, regardless of how recognition is characterized-
express as opposed to implied, conditional as opposed to uncondi-
tional-the fact remains that recognition marks a critical moment in
the life of a nascent State. Recognition, in one form or another, guar-
antees to States and governments myriad tangible and intangible bene-
fits-e.g., ability to enter into treaty relations with third States, access
to foreign courts, diplomatic privileges and immunities, opportunities
for training nationals and technical assistance, opportunities for partici-
pation in institutes and conferences, status as an International Person,
enhancement of international respect for the worth and viability of the
entity, and security in the knowledge that other States recognize the
entity's existence and will work to ensure its development and survival.
Saharan claims relating to participation raise initial questions of
"statehood" and the interpretation of that concept by various interna-
tional institutions. These claims will be considered under the following
categories: (1) claims to membership in international organizations,
160. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 420.
161. Implied recognition is a delicate issue. "The question of implied recognition re-
solves itself into an enquiry as to the kind and type of conduct which, in the absence of clear
indications to the contrary, the law will interpret as amounting to recognition." H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 108, at 369. For a more complete discussion of the doctrine of implied
recognition, see id. at 369-408; 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 123, at 166-77.
162. See note 110 supra.
163. Lauterpacht asserts that recognition can be withdrawn when the legal conditions
for the recognition disappear. He indicates, however, that conditional recognition as gener-
ally understood, means "recognition the grant or continuation of which is made dependent
upon fulfilment of stipulations other than the normal requirements of statehood, of govern-
mental capacity. . . ." H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 358. For a more complete
discussion of the doctrine of conditional recognition, see id. at 357-64.
164. Because the Czech government was not duly constituted by its national assembly,
the United States accorded it only provisional recognition. 6 DEP'T STATE BULL. 440 (1942).
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(2) claims to membership in the U.N., and (3) claims to membership
in the specialized agencies.
A. Claims to Membership in International Organizations
1. The League of Arab States165
Membership in the League is restricted to independent Arab States.
Any such State has "the right" to become a member of the League.
66
In the traditional sense, the SADR is not yet a State, and thus the re-
quirement would seem to preclude admission. And yet some "non-in-
dependent" Arab States, namely the Provisional Government of
Algeria in 1959, have been admitted as observers, while Palestine was
admitted to the League because of what the League regarded as its spe-
cial status. 167
If admission to the League is desired, the Frente POLISARIO con-
ceivably could gain admittance for the SADR as an observer rather
than as a member with full rights. Such a result is the most likely out-
come given the considerable support that Morocco can count on from
its allies.
2. he Organization of African Unity 68
Article IV of the Charter of the O.A.U. states that each independent
sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member State of
the Organization. 169 The legal interpretation of this article grants a
right of membership provided the State pledges to adhere to the O.A.U.
165. The League of Arab States was created by the Arab League Pact of March 22, 1945,
The Pact established a League Council, a Secretariat-General, and permanent committees,
See generally H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES
(1975).
166. Pact of the League of Arab States, art. 1, reprintedin H. HASSOUNA, supra note 165,
at app. A.
167. In the Annex Regarding Palestine, the signatories to the Arab League Pact were of
the opinion that "considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country
can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of
the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work." Pact of the
League of Arab States-Annex Regarding Palestine, reprinted in H. HASSOUNA, supra note
165, at app. B. Before 1964, Palestinian participation in the work of the League was spo-
radic, owing to confusion as to what organization legitimately represented the interests of
the Palestinian people. Since the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(P.L.O.) in 1964, Palestinian participation in the work of the League has been continuous.
H. HASSOUNA, supra note 165, at 264-69.
168. The O.A.U. was formed by 31 African leaders on May 26, 1963. The O.A.U.
currently has 50 Member States. The principal organs of the O.A.U. are: the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, the
Specialized Commissions, the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and
the Liberation Committee (Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa). See
generally K. CERVENKA, THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITY (1977).
169. O.A.U. CHARTER, art. 4, reprinted in K. CERVENKA, supra note 168, at app. 2.
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Charter and to work for the achievement of the objectives therein. 70
O.A.U. practice has been to grant recognized liberation movements an
observer status permitting representatives to participate in O.A.U. con-
ferences without a right to vote. 1
71
On July 4, 1980, at the O.A.U. Summit in Sierra Leone, the Frente
POLISARIO, supported by sixteen African governments, applied for
admission to the O.A.U. as the SADR. 172 Morocco and seven other
States responded to the attempt by threatening to withdraw from the
Organization if the SADR government-in-exile was permitted to join
as a sovereign State. 73 To preserve the unity of the O.A.U., a four-
point plan was adopted that in effect gave both sides a year to gain
additional support. 174
Membership in the O.A.U. would be quite desirable for the SADR.
It appears, however, that the Member States, in spite of the significant
number of them that have either recognized the SADR or supported
the efforts of the Frente POLISARIO, will not now sacrifice the unity
of the O.A.U. to make good those claims.' 75 The Frente POLISARIO
must be content with maintaining its ties to the O.A.U. through the Ad
hoc Committee. 17
6
B. Claims to Membersho in the U.N.
1. Full Membership in the U.N.
The fundamental Charter provision regarding membership in the
U.N. is Article 4(1): "Membership in the United Nations is open to all
other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the
present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations." 177 The prerequisites for admis-
sion stated in Article 4(1) are authoritative and exhaustive. States are
not permitted to consider other factors as preconditions to admitting a
State to membership, although they are permitted to consider factors
going towards the establishment of the five conditions of Article 4(1). 178
170. K. CERVENKA, supra note 168, at 16.
171. Id.
172. Wash. Post, July 3, 1980, at A27, col. 5.
173. Seven States threatened to walk out as a demonstration of support for Morocco:
Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Cameroon, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast. N.Y. Times, July
4, 1980, at A4, col. 6.
174. Id., July 5, 1980, at A4, col. 6.
175. Id. It was reported that the SADR had been recognized by 26 African States, giv-
ing it the majority necessary for admittance to the O.A.U. as a full Member State.
176. See note 108 supra.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 4(1).
178. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4
of the Charter), [1948] I.C.J. 57.
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Procedurally, Article 4(2) mandates that membership in the U.N. re-
quires a favorable recommendation by the Security Council as a condi-
tion precedent followed by a majority vote of approval by the General
Assembly. 179 Thus, admission to the U.N. turns on the interpretation
of the word "State" in Article 4(l).180
The word "State" is used generally and, as its drafting history
reveals, was intended to cover the broadest range of territorial commu-
nities. 18 1 U.N. practice indicates that, in the context of a claim to mem-
bership status, the traditional legal criteria of statehood are not
abandoned, but rather relaxed in relation to the claim in which they are
presented. 8 2 For example, Israel was admitted to the U.N. in spite of
the fact that numerous Arab States and the United Kingdom initially
maintained that, because the borders of Israel were not defined, it was
not a "State" and its admittance as such would be improper.
8 3
At this time, it appears doubtful that the SADR could seriously en-
tertain any hopes of U.N. membership. The success or failure of any
attempt at full membership depends in the first instance on a favorable
recommendation from the Security Council. In view of recent discus-
sions in the Fourth Committee,8 4 it is likely that the United States
would veto an SADR application.
2. Limited Partii),ation in the U.N.
The likelihood that the Frente POLISARIO would be unsuccessful
in an attempt to achieve full membership status does 'not preclude it
from more limited forms of participation. The Frente POLISARIO
has participated in U.N. functions in the past, and should continue to
do so, by ensuring that issues pertinent to its existence are inserted on
the provisional agenda, and by appearing before the U.N.'s main func-
tional bodies and committees. 8 5 In addition, should the Frente
179. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, [1950] I.C.J. I.
180. Questions as to the ability and willingness of an applicant to carry out the obliga-
tions of the Charter are apparently insignificant. See W. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND TIlE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS 61-62 (1975).
181. Id. at 54.
182. Cohen, Concept of Statehood in United A'ations Practice, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1127,
1168 (1961).
183. Id. at 1134 nn. 27 & 28.
184. 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (22d mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/SR. 22 (1980)(statement by
United States representative in the Fourth Committee indicating that the United States is
neutral regarding the future status of Western Sahara).
185. Appearances by Frente POLISARIO representative before the Fourth Committee
in: 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2170th mtg.) 218, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2170 (1975); 30 U.N.
GAOR, C.4 (2178th mtg.) 340, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2178 (1975); 31 U.N. GAOR, C.4
(22d mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/31/SR. 22 (1976); 32 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (10th mtg.) 9,
U.N. Doc. A/C.4/32/SR. 10 (1977); 32 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (19th mtg.) 22, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
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POLISARIO so desire, explicit provisions for full participation by non-
members exist in a number of U.N. organizations. 186 Many of these
organizations provide for associate as well as consultative status.
3. Observer Status
There is no formal observer status to the U.N., though a proposal
was made in 1950 to institutionalize such a status. 87 Observer status
traditionally has been granted to States that are not members of the
U.N. but who have joined one or more of the specialized agencies. 188 It
may be sufficient that an entity has received invitations to participate as
an observer in other international fora (such as multinational confer-
ences) prior to acquiring observer status from the U.N. The P.L.O., for
example, participated in three multinational conferences before it ac-
quired observer status from the General Assembly. The implementing
resolution entitled the P.L.O. to participate as an observer in the ses-
sions and work of the General Assembly, all international conferences
convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and all interna-
tional conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the
U.N.
89
As of this writing, the Frente POLISARIO has not obtained mem-
bership status in any of the specialized agencies. A Frente
POLISARIO claim to acquire "formal" observer status would likely be
rejected unless, prior to raising the claim, it had obtained membership
status in one of the specialized agencies.
C. Claims to Participate in the Specialized Agencies
Entities that would not be considered States in relation to a claim for
comprehensive participation in the U.N. might nevertheless satisfy the
requirements of statehood where the claim is for limited participation.
Although participation in these specialized agencies is not on the level
of the comprehensive participation guaranteed to members of the U.N.,
membership in them does guarantee many benefits that are critical to
the development of a new or nascent State.
32/SR. 19 (1977); 33 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (22d mtg.) 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/33/SR. 22 (1978);
33 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (30th mtg.) 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/33/SR. 30 (1978); 34 U.N. GAOR,
C.4 (14th mtg.) 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/34/SR. 14 (1979); 34 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (15th mtg.) 3,
U.N. Doc. A/C.4/34/SR. 15 (1979); 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (19th mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
35/SR. 19 (1980).
186. See W. REISMAN, supra note 180, at 65.
187. P. BLAIR, THE MINI-STATE DILEMMA 41 (1967). For a discussion of the procedural
issues with respect to observer status, see W. REISMAN, supra note 180, at 66-67.
188. W. REISMAN, supra note 180, at 67.
189. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR, 1 Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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1. The International Labor Organization (IL. 0.)
Article 1 of the I.L.O. Constitution establishes three means of gain-
ing membership. 190 The third means allows non-members of the U.N.
to be admitted to the I.L.O. by a vote of two-thirds of the members
attending a session. The supporting vote must include two-thirds of the
government delegates.
In the recent past, the I.L.O. has assisted national liberation move-
ments by convening special conferences and seminars on issues perti-
nent to the development of labor in new States. To date, such
participation has been limited to national liberation movements recog-
nized by the O.A.U. 191 The Frente POLISARIO, though recognized by
the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U. as the sole legitimate represen-
tative of the Saharan people, 92 has not been so recognized by the As-
sembly of Heads of State and Government. Accordingly, participation
by the Frente POLISARIO in I.L.O. functions appears doubtful absent
an explicit recognition of its legitimacy by the O.A.U.
2. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FA. 0.)
The F.A.O. supervises significant spending of funds of the U.N. De-
velopment Program. The F.A.O. Investment Center, working in col-
laboration with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank, has been engaged in the commitment of many loans and credits
for agricultural development and land reform. It is also a clearing-
house for information on world food and commodity and trade. Mem-
bership in the F.A.O. provides important access to Bank-related
activities for states that are not members of the World Bank. 193
Under Article 2(2) of the F.A.O. Constitution, the Conference may,
by a two-thirds majority vote, admit any "nation" that applies and un-
dertakes to assume the obligations of membership.194
The F.A.O. has sponsored training programs for new and developing
States, and was the first of the specialized agencies to admit Namibia to
full membership. The F.A.O. gives a sizable amount of its funds to the
national liberation movements of Southern Africa recognized by the
O.A.U. 195 Thus, as in the case of the I.L.O., absent a formal declara-
190. I.L.O. CONST., adopted Oct. 9, 1946, art. 4, 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868.
191. 34 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (20th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/34/SR. 20 (1979)(statement
by I.L.O. representative).
192. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV.I161 (1979)(statement by Frente POLISARIO
representative).
193. W. REISMAN, supra note 180, at 84-85.
194. F.A.O. CONST., entered into force Oct. 16, 1945, art. 2(2), 12 U.S.T. 980, T.I.A.S.
4803.




tion by the O.A.U. of the Frente POLISARIO's legitimacy, the SADR
cannot expect to receive direct funding assistance from the F.A.O.
3. The United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)
Article 2(2) of the UNESCO Constitution provides that, after having
received a recommendation of the Executive Board, any State may be
admitted to UNESCO after a two-thirds majority vote of the General
Conference. 96
UNESCO has undertaken a comprehensive program of assistance to
national liberation movements. It has assumed the cost of teachers' sal-
aries, educational supplies, training courses, and related educational
projects for liberation movements in Southern Africa. However, like
the I.L.O. and the F.A.O., UNESCO has extended its services only to
those national liberation movements in southern Africa recognized by
the O.A.U. 197 Again, absent a formal O.A.U. declaration of the legiti-
macy of the Frente POLISARIO, the SADR cannot expect to receive
the direct benefits of UNESCO's vast resources.
4. The World Health Organization (WH. 0.)
Article 3 of the W.H.O. Constitution provides that membership is
open to all States. 98 Article 6 provides that a State becomes a member
of the W.H.O. after its application has been approved by a simple ma-
jority vote of the World Health Assembly. 199
In May, 1979, the World Health Assembly adopted a number of res-
olutions on health assistance to national liberation movements recog-
nized by the O.A.U. It has also made arrangements to allow
representatives of national liberation movements recognized by the
O.A.U. to participate as observers in sessions of the World Health As-
sembly and in W.H.O. regional meetings, and, in 1974, admitted
Namibia as an associate member.2°° Again, absent a formal declara-
tion of the legitimacy of the Frente POLISARIO, the SADR cannot
expect to receive the direct benefits that flow from these resolutions.
196. UNESCO CONST., done Nov. 16, 1945, art. 2(2), 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. 1580, 3
Bevans 1311, 4 U.N.T.S. 275.
197. 34 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (19th mtg.) 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/34/SR. 19 (1979)(statement
by UNESCO representative).
198. W.H.O. CONST., opened for signature July 22, 1946, Ch. III, art. 3, 62 Stat. 2679,
T.I.A.S. 1808, 4 Bevans 119, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
199. Id. art. 6.
200. 34 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (20th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/34/SR. 20 (1979)(statement
by W.H.O. representative).
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IV. Claims to Foreign Assistance
Since the beginning of the armed conflict between the Frente
POLISARIO and the Kingdom of Morocco, the claim has frequently
been made that foreign States may legally assist the Frente
POLISARIO in waging its war of national liberation. A thorough ex-
amination of such a claim is not within the scope of this Article. The
claim will be briefly examined, however, because it could assume con-
siderable importance in the event of a breakdown in negotiations.
A claim that foreign States may legally assist the Frente
POLISARIO in its war of national liberation is thought by some to
raise initial questions of intervention.20' The Frente POLISARIO
claim is based on the following argument:
a) The right of the Saharwi people to self-determination has been ju-
ridically affirmed by the world community in various contexts;
20 2
b) Morocco's occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara is an act
of aggression, according to the definition of aggression adopted by the
General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session,203 a violation of the princi-
ples of the U.N. Charter,2°4 a violation of relevant General Assembly
resolutions, 205 and an illegal act against State independence;
20 6
c) The struggle of peoples under alien domination for the implemen-
tation of their right to self-determination and independence is legitimate
and in full accordance with the principles of international law; 20 7 and
d) Intervention directed against a State that is guilty of an interna-
201. It is probably the case that the use of force by a non-State in exercise of a right to
self-determination is legally neutral, that is, not regulated by law at all (although thejus en
bello may well apply). What is relevant is the legality of action by other States in assisting
or opposing self-determination. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 110.
202. For the most recent affirmation of this right, see Advisory Opinion on Western
Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12.
203. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631, Annex,
art. 3(a) (1974).
204. The Charter prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). In this regard, Morocco's occupation of
Western Sahara, an action in contravention of the self-determination and political indepen-
dence of the Saharwi people, arguably falls within the prohibition of Article 2(4) by virtue of
Article 1(2). Article 1(2) states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o de-
velop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples. . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
205. In addition to the U.N. resolutions specific to the application of the right to self-
determination and independence of the Saharwi people, Morocco's actions violate the prin-
ciple of Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 42, that States have a duty to refrain from any action
which deprives people of "their right to self-determination and freedom and independence."
206. Morocco's actions represent "a supreme attack against the highest of the interna-
tionally protected interests of a State: its existence. It therefore represents the most drastic
illegality that can be committed." K. MAREK, supra note 129, at 554.
207. G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, I Supp. (No. 30) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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tional wrong is not illegal.208
The traditionalist counter-argument 20 9 is that outside aid to national
liberation movements is illegal. Under this view of international law,
all States owe at least a duty of neutrality to the threatened govern-
ment, and any State, if invited, may come to its aid.210 Any other ac-
tion on the part of third States would amount to a violation of the
territorial integrity of the threatened government.
The traditionalist counter-argument is without force in Western Sa-
hara because it is based on the same theoretical framework upon which
legal distinctions concerning the obligations of States to governments
beset by rebellions, insurgencies, and belligerencies were built.2 1 That
framework, premised on the notion of respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the incumbent government, is not applicable in
Western Sahara where no incumbent government can be said to ex-
ist,2 12 and where the territory in question was never part of the national
territory of Morocco. 213 The law applicable here concerns decoloniza-
tion; it is based on the primacy of the right of colonial peoples to self-
determination.2
14
V. Claims Relating to Non-Recognition
The essence of non-recognition of a territorial transfer is the refusal,
on the part of the non-recognizing power, to accept the acts of the dis-
possessing power as those of a rightful sovereign.215 Where the illegal-
ity involves a norm ofjus cogens, States have a duty under customary
international law-individually and collectively-not to recognize the
act as legal.2 16
In the context of statehood and territorial status, collective non-rec-
ognition has been adopted in the case of "illegal entities." This duty of
collective non-recognition, which first made its appearance in the Stim-
son Doctrine and the resolutions of the League of Nations in the Man-
208. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 286 (4th ed. 1949).
209. The most articulate advocate of the traditional view is Professor E. V. Rostow. See
E. RosTow, THE IDEAL IN LAW 280 (1970).
210. Tyner, Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine: Self-Determinationfor
Peoples or Territories? 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 253 (1979).
211. See text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
212. See notes 124, 127 supra.
213. The I.C.J. found no legal ties sufficient to validate Morocco's claim to Western
Sahara. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 56-57.
214. Id. at 36.
215. R. LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY 96 (1974).
216. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 123.
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churian crisis, 217 has more recently been invoked in the case of
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Namibia. 21 8 The importance of a col-
lective duty of non-recognition is that, more than enjoining the status
of the entity in question, it underscores the illegality of the situation
and helps to prevent its consolidation.
219
In the context of Western Sahara, the Moroccan occupation of the
territory is in direct contravention of the right of the Saharwi people to
self-determination. Thus, the collective duty of non-recognition as ap-
plied to the Moroccan occupation should extend to all actions by Mo-
roccan officials where the claim is made that they are acting in the
political and/or economic interests of the Saharwi people.
220
Conclusion
Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara, contravening the right of
the Saharwi people to self-determination, is not the first such preemp-
tion of self-determination in the post-colonial era. Both in West Irian
in 1972 and in East Timor in 1975 a neighboring State with a territorial
claim invaded the Non-Self-Governing Territory in order to prevent
the colonial people from exercising their right to self-determination.
The utility of belligerent occupation as a means of defeating claims to
self-determination was put to the test in both instances with results that
make the case of Western Sahara all the more important to the
vindictation of the principles of self-determination embodied in Reso-
lution 1514(XV).
Military action by the Republic of Indonesia against West Irian irre-
217. Id. at 122. See also, R. LANGER, supra note 215, at 50-74; Garner, Non-recognition
of Illegal Territorial Annexations and Claims to Sovereignty, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1936).
218. In the case of Rhodesia, non-recognition was enforced through sanctions under
Chapter VII of the Charter. See 20 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 8, U.N. Doc. S/
Res/217 (1965); 23 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/253 (1968);
25 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/277 (1970). In the case of
Namibia, the I.C.J., inter alia, held that the duty of non-recognition implied abstension from
economic and other relationships or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning
Namibia which might entrench South African authority over the territory. Advisory Opin-
ion on Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. 16.
219. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 108, at 412. Non-recognition is only a precondition
for other enforcement action and a method of asserting the values involved in the relevant
legal rules. It is not a sanction in and of itself. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 17, at 122-23.
220. This should include claims of authority to sell phosphate extracted from the mines
at Bu Craa. Early in 1979, it was reported that the Bu Craa mine operated by FOS-
BUCRAA had resumed production under heavy guard. The mine had been closed since
1976. 34 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 23) 114, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L. 1331 (1979). More-
over, on January 4, 1979, Hassan II named a Secretary of State for Saharan Affairs and three
new governors for the so-called "provinces" of the Sahara. Id. at 110.
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versibly defeated the West Irians' claim to self-determination. 22' The
General Assembly subsequently sealed their fate in Resolution
2504(XXIV).2 22 Indonesian occupation and annexation of East Ti-
mor2 23 has thus far served to deny the indigenous population their right
to self-determination, 224 and has resulted in a situation where many
States now consider East Timor a matter within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of Indonesia.225 Yet, in spite of the consolidation and stabilization
of Indonesian control in East Timor, the General Assembly has contin-
ued to voice its support for the right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination and independence, endorsing the legitimacy of their
struggle to realize that right.
226
Nevertheless, formalistic adherence to the principles of Resolution
221. Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962, 437 U.N.T.S. 273, reprinted
in 17 U.N. GAOR, 3 Annexes (Agenda Item 89) 1, U.N. Doc. A/5170, Annex (1962). The
agreement ended the hostilities between the two States and laid the foundation for the "act
of free choice" held in West Irian in 1969.
222. G.A. Res. 2504, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 3, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
223. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands that forms the
Republic of Indonesia. The western part of the island, known as Timor Barat, has always
been part of Indonesia. East Timor, the area formerly under Portuguese administration,
totals 14,925 square kilometers. 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization,
supra note 7, at 118.
224. In July, 1975, the Portuguese government adopted a law providing for the forma-
tion of a transitional government in East Timor to prepare for the election of a popular
assembly in October, 1976 and the eventual termination of Portuguese sovereignty in Octo-
ber, 1978. Id. In December, 1975, however, Indonesian naval, air, and land forces invaded
East Timor. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 53, U.N. Doc. S/11899 (1975). There
followed a period of intense armed conflict between the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor
Leste Independente (FRETILIN), which had, on November 28, 1975, declared the forma-
tion of an independent East Timorese State, and the armed forces of Indonesia, aided by
pro-Indonesian parties: the Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI), the
Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT), the Klibur Oan Timor Asaiain (KOTA), and the
Partido Probalhista. On July 17, 1976, the President of Indonesia promulgated law 7/76
providing for the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia and the establish-
ment of East Timor as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia. 1979 Report of the Special
Comittee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at 120.
225. Apparently, Indonesia has successfuly consolidated its control over East Timor. In
response to this situation, the governments of many States, in particular those close to East
Timor, have accepted the integration of East Timor into Indonesia as irreversible and, in
some cases, have extended defacto recognition to the annexation. 1979 Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at 121-22. For the distinction between
belligerent occupation and defacto government, see note 138 supra.
226. G.A. Res. 33/39, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 181, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
It is not altogether clear that all members of the international community have given legal
effect to Indonesia's illegal actions. On May 20, 1979, an International Seminar on East
Timor, held in Lisbon, decided to request the Portuguese government to start a diplomatic
campaign centered at the U.N. seeking the implementation of relevant General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions, particularly those calling for the immediate withdrawal of
Indonesian military forces and a visit to East Timor by a special representative of the Secre-
tary-General. 1979 Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization, supra note 7, at
122-23.
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1514(XV) does not guarantee their effective realization. One may ap-
propriately view the resolution of the Saharan conflict as a crucial in-
stance in the development of international law and practice under
Resolution 1514(XV) and a signal opportunity for the members of the
international community to stand up and be counted regarding the
proper community response to belligerent occupation in opposition to
self-determination. Moreover, the importance of this case to those re-
maining Non-Self-Governing Territories should not be overlooked.
The six-nation subcommittee of the O.A.U. Ad hoc Committee con-
tinued its efforts to resolve the Saharan dispute into 1980. On July 5,
1980, at the O.A.U. summit in Sierra Leone, in the midst of a divisive
effort to seat the Frente POLISARIO as the SADR,227 a four-point
plan was adopted that in effect gave supporters of both the Frente
POLISARIO and Morocco a year to gain additional support.228 In
September, 1980, pursuant to the Sierra Leone accord, the six-nation
panel proposed a fair and general election and a U.N. supervised cease-
fire as a solution to the dispute.
During the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of O.A.U. held at Nairobi from June 24 to 27,
1981, King Hassan II reportedly announced that he was prepared to
agree to a cease-fire in Western Sahara and to a referendum under in-
ternational supervision. The Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment subsequently accepted the reports and recommendations of the
fifth and sixth sessions of the Ad hoc Committee of Heads of State on
Western Sahara and decided to set up an Implementation Committee
to ensure, with the cooperation of the concerned parties, the implemen-
tation of the recommendations of the Ad hoc Committee.229
On November 11, 1980, the General Assembly adopted its most re-
cent resolution on Western Sahara.230 It reaffirmed the inalienable
right of the Saharwi people to self-determination and independence,
and, in a further recognition of the legitimacy of the Frente
POLISARIO, specifically urged Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO
227. See text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
228. Decision Adopted at the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec.
118(XVII), reprintedin U.N. Doc. A/35/529, Annex (1980).
229. Working paper on Western Sahara, prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/667 (1981). The State Members of the Implementation Committee are Guinea, Ke-
nya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
230. G.A. Res. 35/19, 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 48) , U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980),
text reprinted in Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the
First Part of its Thirty-Fifth Session 362-63, U.N. Doc. GA/6375 (1981).
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to enter into direct negotiations to arrive at a definitive settlement in
Western Sahara.
Hostilities continue in Western Sahara between the Saharwi People's
Army of the Frente POLISARIO and the Army of Morocco while the
Frente POLISARIO and the SADR government-in-exile have secured
significant diplomatic and domestic victories.23' On the diplomatic
front, the SADR government-in-exile has been recognized by, and has
established diplomatic relations with forty-four countries of Asia, Af-
rica, and Latin America;232 the Frente POLISARIO has been recog-
nized as the legitimate representative of the Saharan people by over
one hundred national and international institutions.233 On the domes-
tic front, the SADR government-in-exile and the Frente POLISARIO
have established primary and secondary schools, literacy and voca-
tional training courses, dispensaries, and hospitals.234 In addition, four
National POLISARIO Congresses have thus far been held.235 From all
appearances, the SADR-is well on its way towards establishing and
maintaining the governmental institutions necessary for the rapid de-
velopment of a heretofore deprived population.
Yet, a partial victory is really no victory at all. The coming months
will prove to be critical to the future of the SADR and its government-
in-exile. The O.A.U. Implementation Committee has already begun
preparations for the referendum in Western Sahara, an event that King
Hassan II maintains could occur as early as November, 1981.236
Consideration of the Saharan conflict by the O.A.U. should not be
viewed as a bar to further affirmative action by the U.N., its specialized
agencies, and third States. In this regard, it must be repeated that the
SADR has, as of this writing, been recognized by forty-four States.
This fact reflects the willingness of a significant segment of the world
community to see the decolonization process in Western Sahara to the
231. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1980, at A13, col. 5; Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1980, at A12, col.
3.
232. Working paper on Western Sahara prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/667 (1981).
233. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV.1161 (1979)(statement by Frente POLISARIO represen-
tative before the Fourth Committee).
234. 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (19th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/SR. 19 (1980).
235. First National POLISARIO Congress, May 10, 1973, reportedin Report of the Vis-
iting Mission to Spanish Sahara, supra note 3, at 63; Second National POLISARIO Con-
gress, Aug. 25-31, 1974, reportedin 32 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (19th mtg.) 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
32/SR. 19 (1977); Third National POLISARIO Congress, Aug. 26-30, 1976, reported in 31
U.N. GAOR, C.4 (22d mtg.) 10, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/31/SR. 22 (1976); Fourth National
POLISARIO Congress, Oct. 1978, reported in 1979 Report of the Special Committee on
Decolonization, supra note 7, at 111.
236. Working paper on Western Sahara prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/667 (1981).
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conclusion deemed just by advocates of self-determination in the
decolonization process. Yet further action is necessary. The following
course of action is, in the author's view, a reasonable, legally sound
response to Morocco's belligerent occupation, and an appropriate
means of ensuring the effective realization of the right of the Saharwi
people to self-determination:
1) Recognition of and establishment of diplomatic relations with the
SADR by those States that have not already done so,
2) Lobbying efforts by those States that have either recognized the
SADR or support the Frente POLISARIO to ensure these entities' access
to and participation in the benefits of programs conducted by F.A.O.,
UNESCO, and W.H.O., in spite of the absence of a formal recognition of
legitimacy by the O.A.U.;237
3) Non-recognition of Morocco's asserted authority to carry on eco-
nomic and other dealings with third States in the interest of, or on behalf
of the Saharwi people, particularly with respect to the sale of phosphates
extracted from the mine at Bu Craa.
In the event of Moroccan recalcitrance regarding the work of the
O.A.U. Implementation Committee, the following course of action, in
addition to the three steps mentioned above, is an appropriate means
by which to ensure the complete decolonization of Western Sahara:
1) The Fourth Committee and the General Assembly should initiate
discussions with a view towards granting observer status to the Frente
POLISARIO on terms similar to those granted to the P.L.O.;
2) The twenty-six Member States of O.A.U. that have recognized the
SADR give it the majority necessary to gain membership in the Assembly
as a sovereign State;238 and, accordingly, at the 19th O.A.U. Summit,
those States should initiate an attempt to seat the SADR as a full
member,
3) Should hostilities escalate between Morocco and the Frente
POLISARIO, third States may legally provide the Frente POLISARIO
with the military assistance necessary to continue its war of national liber-
ation, with the understanding that assistance in the form of combat per-
sonnel is prohibited.
239
237. See note 191 supra.
238. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1980, at A4, col. 6.
239. Non-intervention as a peremptory norm in this type of conflict is both unenforce-
able and unacceptable. Intervention on behalf of, or more appropriately, foreign military
assistance to the Frente POLISARIO, should be limited to any type or quantity of assistance
not involving foreign personnel in actual combat. Such a prohibition does not preclude, for
example, staffing training centers or advising the indigenous high command. Farer, Inter-
vention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266, 276 (1967). The view
that self-determination requires that outside assistance never be given to any faction con-
ceals the naive assumption that whatever takes place within the confines of a territorial
entity is pursuant to genuine self-determination of peoples and that outside "intervention" is
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Although the law of decolonization is not well-defined and State
practice in matters of decolonization varies depending on both the in-
ternational interest in the Non-Self-Governed Territory in question
and the specific State interest at stake, the case of Western Sahara offers
an opportunity for introducing greater predictability in this area. The
international community, having recognized, and juridically affirmed,
the right of a colonial people to self-determination must act to vindi-
cate that right.
Recognition by the I.C.J. of the right of the Saharwi people to self-
determination should not be narrowly construed as the foundation on
which the arguments and conclusions in this Article rest. The I.C.J.
affirmed the right of the Saharwi people to self-determination; indeed,
the right to self-determination for all colonial peoples. This right has
been the driving force behind the activities of the Fourth Committee.
Therefore, the conclusions reached herein are applicable in any situa-
tion where, at a minimum, the right of a specific colonial people of a
Non-Self-Governing Territory to self-determination has been recog-
nized and affirmed in the activities of the General Assembly and the
Fourth Committee. The case of Western Sahara merely represents the
strongest case for the application of these conclusions.
The vitality of Resolution 1514(XV) and the future of the
decolonization movement turn, in part, on the outcome of the Western
Sahara conflict. Belligerent occupation in opposition to self-determina-
tion cannot be permitted to become a viable alternative for those States
that would raise territorial claims to a Non-Self-Governing Territory.
necessarily disruptive of self-determination. Such a view confuses self-determination of en-
tities with genuine self-determination of peoples. Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assist-
ance to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 30 (1967).
